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The purpose of this inquiry is to explicate the sense, unities, and points of departure of the 
Parmenidean “what-is-not” and the void as conceived of in Ancient Atomic Theory purported to 
Leucippus and Democritus, hereafter referred to as AAT. I assert that Parmenidean One can be 
accommodated by AAT given Parmenides relaxes his requirement the One be motionless and hold 
his commitment to the necessity of limit. 
The Parmenidean first principles asserts that the two modes of inquiry, concerning “what-is” 
and “what-is-not.” Since it is useless to inquire about the “what-is-not”, all that remains is to inquire 
about “what-is.” And now that we cannot divide “what-is” into further components, we are left with 
the Parmenidean One. 
 Consider the features of the Parmenidean One1: 
a) The One is Eternal 
b) The One is Indivisible 
c) The One is Motionless 
d) The One is Complete 
(a), (b) and (d) seem reasonable. The denial of motion appears to function to maintain Parmenides’ 
commitments to the omnidirectionality2 of the One and a commitment to the ultimacy of limit3 rather 
than a claim about the nature of motion in the world. For Parmenides, the completeness of the One 
is grounded in the necessity of the limit.4 If we can get Parmenides to agree to the that the ultimate 
 
1 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 
2 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 44 
3 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 42 
4 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 31 
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nature of the limit is infinite, which is the nature of the void,5 he will be in a much friendlier position 
to consider the void in formulating his first principles if he weren’t to dispel it as mere “mortal 
opinion.”6 
The features and commitments of AAT are loosely characterized by the six authors of antiquity 
who outlined Democritus’ view and rehashed as follows: 
a) All is causally determined by the movement of atoms in the void7 
b) Atoms are indivisible, uniform units of reality8 
c) Atoms have size and differ in shape, arrangement and position9 
d) Atoms collide and entangle with other atoms, propelled by difference10/similarity11 
e) Atoms can envelop void and produce surface qualities12 
f) Surface qualities are not real but are perceptible in virtue of an atom’s arrangement13 
Aristotle characterizes Leucippus and Democritus both as being in agreement over the “what-is-not” 
[to me on] being empty14 and the void [ouden] is infinite since the finite is “what is full [and] cannot 
admit anything else.”15 The Democritean turn is the embrace of the void, being the not-hing that 
consumes the “what-is”. Where there is the void is therefore necessary for separation of bodies. It 
is not unlike the Parmenidean “what-is-not” in that it refers to a lack of some-thing, but the void is 
distinct in virtue of being nothing but lack. Restated, it is nothing and lacks everything. That is to say, 
the void is in virtue of its potential. In contrast, the “what-is-not” does not exist and for Parmenides, 
 
5 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotles On the Heavens 242.21-26 
6 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 31 
7 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians 7.138 
8 Aëtius 1.3.18 
9 Aristotle, On Democritus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 295.1-22 
10 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 242.21-26 
11 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.31-32 
12 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.31-32 
13 Theophrastus, Causes of Plants 6.1.6 
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.4 985b4-20 
15 Aristotle, Physics IV.6 213a27-b22 
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about which nothing can be meaningfully spoke.16 The distinction between “what-is-not” and the void 
was slight enough that they have been used interchangeably four times17 in the fragments of 
Democritus’ thought but it mattered enough for Parmenides to maintain his position. 
Parmenides claims that, “[I]t is full of what-is. Therefore, it is all holding together; for what 
is draws near to what is,”18 asserting there is a cohesive nature to the stuff of what-is. This cohesive 
property is echoed in AAT’s treatment of atoms and compound bodies. There is ambiguity in what 
grounds movement in the fragments of Democritus, of which I will call the major interpretation and 
the minor interpretation. The major, Aristotelian interpretation of movement portrays movement of 
atoms due to their dissimilarities19. The minor, Diogenesian interpretation portrays the movement 
of atoms in virtue of their similarities, “like to like.”20 Parmenides would not accept the major 
interpretation as he does not admit difference “for nothing else either is or will be except what is.”21 
He may allow a minor interpretation but not without suspending his requirement of the One to be 
motionless and even then he may contend that the similar atoms are not distinct in virtue of their 
similarity. That is to say, because of a particular relation to fixity. A rebuttal: that fixity is the limit of 
the atom, the “great bonds” of necessity that ground a commitment to completeness, fullness. 
The limit occurs at the end of all direction22, where the not-hing is nowhere to be found. That is 
to say what does not terminate is the infinite nature of the void. The limit holds, that is, contains, 
that “what-is” on “all sides”23 and so that it is “not incomplete” and “not lacking.” But if “what-is” 
 
16 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 1.345.18; lines 3-8 
17 J. Dayley, Democritus' Parmenidean Influence 58 
18 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 
19 Aristotle, On Democritus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 295.1-22 
20 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 9.31-32 
21 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 36 
22 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 
23 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25; 39.1-9 line 51-62 
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already contains a cohesive nature, what is the limit holding onto? What then is on the other side of 
“what-is?”  
Positing the void was preceded by the empirical observation of movement and separation 
between beings. The void is necessary for movement of atoms24 and change25 whereas Parmenides 
does not permit movement or change to exist, claiming they are merely appearances of the One. 
The Eleatics concluded there could be no motion without void26 as what-is, being completely full has 
nothing to expand into “as two bodies cannot coincide.”27 A possible positive interpretation here is 
that fullness possesses nothing in which it expands, where of being surrounded by emptiness that it 
displaces. Democritus described what others could not see. I contend that the Parmenidean concept 
of limit can bridge Parmenides and AAT. Rudolf Siegel also holds the view that Parmenides never 
explicitly denied the void28 and concerned himself with were less epistemological matters than 
ontological ones. 
Considering the One was postulated in response to the eccentric theories of the Milesians, it 
seems like an improvement in form and content. Parmenides provides a theory that does not depend 
upon otherworldly forces, but his concept of the One forecloses upon movement, change, and the 
plurality of being. It is this cut that Democritus seeks to parry through the admission of a void as an 
answer to account for the reality of separation. The “what-is-not” is born from the negation of what-
is, which is mere instance but for Parmenides and proponents of the AAT, necessity is “what-is.” In 
virtue of the indivisibility and completeness of the One, what remains of “what-is” engulfed by the 
void is the atom which is the One. 
 
24 Aristotle, Physics IV.6 213a27-b22 
25 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 1318.35-1319.5 
26 Aristotle, On coming-to be and Ceasing-to-be 1.8 324b35-325a36 
27 Aristotle, Physics IV.6 213a27-b22 
28 R. Siegel, Parmenides and the Void 264-266 
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Proponents of AAT would be right to seek to rehabilitate Parmenides and transform his 
existential claim of “there is only one” to a universal disjunction, “All is either atom or void.” Aristotle 
characterized the void as an “interval in which there is no perceptible body29 Simplicius recalls 
division occurs where there is void in a body.30 This is coherent with the Parmenidean One’s 
requirement of indivisibility. What is expelled from the atom is that what is cut off from the void, 
for “[t]here is no reason for the “hing” to be than the nothing.”31 
Where the AAT and Parmenides differ is in their initial positions and first commitments. The 
AAT is pluralistic, declaring principles to be “infinite in multitude”32 and presupposes “what-is“ and 
“what-is-not”, positing one more kind of reality (the void) over the monistic Parmenides who asserts 
there is only One and denies being to “what-is-not”.  
AAT and Parmenides align in the necessity of being. That is to say, that being could not have 
appeared or have actually been different than it actually appears.33 
The Atomists and the Eleatic hold that it is impossible for the many for come from one34. Both see 
perceptible qualities as illusory. For AAT, perceptible qualities are reductions of clusters of 
particular arrangements of atoms that give rise to sensations that are not found in the constituent 
bodies but in virtue of their surface qualities35.  
While proponents of AAT and Parmenides do share the idea that the perceptible world is made 
of appearances, they differ what grounds the appearance For AAT, it is impossible for many to come 
from one36 because separation can only occur when there is a void between bodies37 which would 
 
29 Aristotle, Physics IV.6 213a27-b22 
30 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 242.18-21 
31 Plutarch, Against Colotes 1108F 
32 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 242.18-21 
33 Aëtius 1.25.4 and Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1-146.25 line 45-50 
34 Aristotle, On Democritus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 295.1-22 
35 Aristotle, On Democritus, quoted by Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 295.1-22 
36 Aristotle, On coming-to be and Ceasing-to-be 1.8 324b35-325a36 
37 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 242.18-21 
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imply that the being was a plurality from the beginning. For Parmenides, he reiterates that it is 
impossible for many to come from one in virtue of there being only One, the “what-is”. 
While we may not get Parmenides to admit to the existence of the void, it is possible to 
maintain that AAT would accept that “what-is-not” does not exist38. AAT similarly could 
accommodate 3 of 4 of the requirements of the Parmenidean One in the concept of the atom. 
However, it is doubtful whether Parmenides would concede to the existence of motion given his 
commitment to the non-existence of the “what-is-not.” To conclude, the necessity of the limit 
grounds the completeness of the One and entails an infinity not contained by the One which is the 
void that Parmenides sought but the object of which he preferred not to speak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
38 J. Dayley, Democritus' Parmenidean Influence 59 
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